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Abstract
Although logical consistency is desirable in scientific research, stan-
dard statistical hypothesis tests are typically logically inconsistent. In
order to address this issue, previous work introduced agnostic hypoth-
esis tests and proved that they can be logically consistent while re-
taining statistical optimality properties. This paper characterizes the
credal modalities in agnostic hypothesis tests and uses the hexagon of
oppositions to explain the logical relations between these modalities.
Geometric solids that are composed of hexagons of oppositions illus-
trate the conditions for these modalities to be logically consistent.
Prisms composed of hexagons of oppositions show how the credal
modalities obtained from two agnostic tests vary according to their
threshold values. Nested hexagons of oppositions summarize logical
relations between the credal modalities in these tests and prove new
relations.
Keywords: statistical hypothesis tests, hexagon of oppositions, logical
consistency, agnostic hypothesis tests, probabilistic and alethic modalities.
AMS Classification: 03B42, 03B45, 62A01, 62C10, 62F05.
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1 Introduction
Logical consistency is desirable in scientific research. It can be hard to inter-
pret inconsistent conclusions and to develop theories that explain them. As a
result, they are detrimental to scientific communication and decision-making.
Despite the desirability of logical consistency, it is not satisfied by many
methods of statistical hypothesis testing. For instance, consider that a re-
searcher simultaneously tests two hypotheses, A and B, such that “not B”
implies “not A”. In such a situation, one expects that the rejection of B
would imply the rejection of A. However, this property does not apply to
standard tests, such as the ones based on the p-value or the Bayes factor
(Schervish, 1996; Lavine and Schervish, 1999; Fossaluza et al., 2017).
Besides this flaw, one can find other logical inconsistencies in standard
hypothesis testing procedures. Izbicki and Esteves (2015); da Silva et al.
(2015) classify the types of logical inconsistencies in these procedures into
failures to satisfy at least one of four of conditions of classical logics. If all
conditions are satisfied by a test, then it is defined as logically consistent.
This use of the term contrasts with the one in the literature of non-classical
logics, in which (in)consistency often refers to forms of modifying classical
notions of contradiction, negation, conflation, etc. so as to allow logical
systems with greater flexibility than classical logic (Carnielli et al., 2007;
Carnielli and Coniglio, 2016; Stern, 2004). Izbicki and Esteves (2015) shows
that a standard test is logically consistent if and only if it is based on point
estimation, which generally does not satisfy statistical optimality.
This grim result motivated Esteves et al. (2016) to investigate agnostic
hypothesis tests. Such a test is a function, L, that assigns to each hypothesis,
H , a value in {0, 0.5, 1}. H is accepted when L(H) = 0, H is rejected when
L(H) = 1 and the test noncomitally neither accepts nor rejects H when
L(H) = 0.5. In this paper, we use agnostic tests to define credal modalities,
as described in Table 1.
Using this framework, Esteves et al. (2016) shows that the agnostic gen-
eralizations of some standard hypothesis tests can achieve logical consistency.
Indeed, a hypothesis test is logically consistent if and only if it is based on a
region estimator. As a result, there exist agnostic hypothesis tests that are
both logically consistent and statistically optimal.
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Modality Definition Name Equivalence Interpretation
H L(H) = 0 Necessity (A) ∆H ∧3H H is accepted
¬3H L(H) = 1 Impossibility (E) ∆H ∧ ¬H H is rejected
∇H L(H) = 0.5 Contingency (Y) 3H ∧ ¬H H not decided
3H L(H) < 1 Possibility (I) H ∨∇H H not rejected
¬H L(H) > 0 Non-necessity (O) ¬3H ∨∇H H not accepted
∆H L(H) 6= 0.5 Non-contingency (U) H ∨ ¬3H H is decided
Table 1: Modalities of agnostic hypothesis tests.
This positive result motivates the development of schematic diagrams
for explaining agnostic tests and their logical properties. The relations be-
tween the credal modalities in Table 1 can be represented by the hexagon
of oppositions (Blanche´, 1953; Blanche´ and Davy, 1981). It follows from the
definition in Table 1 that these credal modalities are defined by opposition
relations in well ordered structures, such as the ones in Be´ziau (2012, 2015).
Although this paper considers solely total orders, extensions of the hexagon
of oppositions to partial orders can be found in Demey and Smessaert (2016).
Figure 1 represents the standard hexagon of oppositions. Each credal
modality is associated with one vertex in the logical hexagon, namely: A
(necessity), E (impossibility), I (possibility), O (non-necessity), U (non-
contingency) and Y (contingency).1 In Figure 1, logical relations between
modalities are represented as edges, which are classified according to the
following types:
• arrows: indicate logical implications, that is, if modality J points to K
1 The four vowels used to label the vertices of the traditional square of opposition are
chosen from the Latin word AfIrmo, for affirming universal (necessary) and particular
(possible) modal propositions, and nEgO for negating them. Blanche´ (1953) extended the
square into the hexagon of opposition, using the two remaining French vowels to label
the top and bottom of its six vertices. Some confusion comes from the historical use of
four vowels (A, E, I and U) to describe which part(s) of a modal proposition (modus
and dictum) are negated. This description follows the mnemonic rule: nihil A, E dictum
negat, Ique modum, U totum, meaning: A- neither modus nor dictum is negated, E-
dictum is negated I- modus is negated, U- modus and dictum are negated. Finally, each
corner of the square of opposition is traditionally labeled by an anagram describing the
(four) equivalent modal propositions obtained by using, respectively, the modality of –
necessary, impossible, contingent and possible. Mnemonic anagrams are provided by the
Latin words: (A) Purpurea - purple, (E) Iliace - colicky, (I) Amabimus - lovely, and (O)
Edentuli - no-tooth; see (Dumitriu, 1977, v.II, p.109-111).
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Figure 1: The hexagon of oppositions for an agnostic hypothesis test.
and J is obtained, then K is also obtained.
• dashed-lines: indicate contrariety, that is, modalities connected by
these lines cannot both be true.
• dotted-lines: indicate sub-contrariety, that is, modalities connected by
these lines cannot both be false.
• double-lines: indicate contradictions, that is, modalities connected by
these lines cannot either be both true or be both false.
This paper characterizes the credal modalities from the statistical theory
developed in Esteves et al. (2016) and uses the hexagon of oppositions to
explain the logical properties that arise in these modalities. Section 2 uses
polyhedra based on the hexagon of oppositions to present the four condi-
tions for a test to be logically consistent. Next, hexagonal prisms illustrate
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the construction of the modalities that arise from standard hypothesis tests
(Section 3) and that arise from a logically consistent agnostic test (Section 4).
Section 5 uses a nested hexagon of oppositions to discuss the logical relations
between the modalities obtained in Sections 3 and 4.
Note that Sections 3 and 4 examine two different types of credal modal-
ities. In order to avoid ambiguity, the credal modality defined in each sec-
tion is represented by a different symbol. Section 3 defines credal modalities
based on threshold values on a probability measure over the space of hypothe-
ses. Since probability is an additive measure, the corresponding probabilistic
modalities are represented by superposing the plus sign to the standard modal
symbols (⊞, +3, +∇ and +∆). In contrast, Section 4 defines credal modalities
based on threshold values on a possibilistic measure over the space of hy-
potheses. The corresponding alethic modalities are denoted by the standard
modal symbols (, 3, ∇ and ∆). For a detailed explanation of probabil-
ity and possibility measures see Dubois and Prade (1982); Borges and Stern
(2007); Stern and Pereira (2014).
2 Logical conditions on agnostic tests
In order to discuss the logical conditions on statistical tests, it is necessary
to present some definitions. A parameter is an unknown or unobservable
quantity with possible values in an arbitrary set, Θ, named the parameter
space. A statistical hypothesis, H , is a statement about a parameter. It is
of the form H : θ ∈ ΘH , where ΘH is an element of an arbitrary σ-field
over Θ. For example, the parameter space could be Θ = Rd, d ∈ N∗, and a
hypothesis could be stated as a linear equation, H : Aθ = b, corresponding
to the hypothesis set ΘH = {θ ∈ R
d |Aθ = b}. Whenever there is no
ambiguity, the symbol H is used as a shortcut for ΘH , although the former is
a statement and the latter is a set. A statistical hypothesis test is a function
that attributes credal modalities to each statistical hypothesis.
Esteves et al. (2016) introduces four logical consistency conditions for sta-
tistical hypothesis tests: invertibility, monotonicity, union consonance and
intersection consonance. In the following, these properties are represented
using geometric solids composed of hexagons of oppositions.
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3H˜
∇H˜¬2H˜
¬3H˜
∆H˜ 2H˜
¬2H
∇H
3H
2H
∆H ¬3H
Figure 2: A representation of invertibility using two hexagons of oppositions.
H˜ denotes the negation of a hypothesis H . Two modalities are connected by
a bidirectional arrow if each one implies and is implied by the other.
2.1 Invertibility
Invertibility restrains the conclusions that can be obtained when simulta-
neously testing a hypothesis, H , and its set complement, H˜ = Θ − H . If
invertibility holds, then either both hypotheses are undecided or one is ac-
cepted and the other is rejected. This restriction is represented symbolically
in Definition 2.1:
Definition 2.1 (Invertibility).
(H ⇐⇒ ¬3H˜) ∧ (∇H ⇐⇒ ∇H˜)
Figure 2 uses two hexagons of opposition to represent Definition 2.1.
The hexagons for H (below) and H˜ (above) are joined by double-arrowed
edges to form a hexagonal prism. These edges illustrate that, if invertibility
holds, then the connected modalities necessarily occur simultaneously. The
modalities in the H˜ hexagon are inverted in relation to the modalities in the
H hexagon. As a result, if invertibility holds, then one obtains the following
logical equivalences: A↔ E˜, E ↔ A˜, I ↔ O˜, O ↔ I˜, U ↔ U˜, Y ↔ Y˜.
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2.2 Monotonicity
Monotonicity restrains the conclusions that can be obtained when simulta-
neously testing nested hypotheses. Two hypotheses, H and H ′, are nested if
H implies H ′ (H ⊆ H ′). If monotonicity holds, then the conclusion obtained
for H ′ is always at least as favorable as the conclusion obtained for H . That
is, if H is accepted, then H ′ is accepted and, if H is possible, then H ′ is
possible. This restriction is represented symbolically in Definition 2.2.
Definition 2.2 (Monotonicity).
H ⊆ H ′ ⇒
{
H ⇒ H ′
3H ⇒ 3H ′
Figure 3 represents monotonicity through the hexagon of oppositions.
The hexagon for H ′ is larger than the one for H as a means to illustrate
that H ⊆ H ′. These hexagons are connected by additional edges to form
a pyramidal frustum. Each horizontal cut of this solid can be thought to
represent a new hypothesis. These hypotheses imply the ones below them
and are implied by the ones above them. The arrows that go from the top
of the frustum to its bottom represent that, if a hypothesis is below another,
then the conclusion obtained for the lower one should be at least as favorable
as the one obtained for the upper one. The arrows that go in the opposite
direction are obtained by taking the negation of the previous implications.
As a result of monotonicity, one obtains the following logical implications:
A→ A’, I→ I’, O’→ O, E’→ E.
2.3 Consonance
Consonance restricts the conclusions that one can obtain when simultane-
ously testing a set of hypotheses and their unions or intersections. Let {Hi}i∈I
be an arbitrary collection of hypotheses. Under strong union consonance, if
one concludes that ∪i∈IHi is possible, then at least one Hi is possible. Sim-
ilarly, under strong intersection consonance, if one concludes that ∩i∈IHi is
not necessary, then at least one Hi is not necessary. These restrictions are
represented symbolically in Definitions 2.3 and 2.4.
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¬2H2H
∆H ¬3H
¬2H ′
∇H ′3H ′
2H ′
Figure 3: Logical implications induced by monotonicity (blue arrows). The
figure displays stacked hexagons of statistical modalities for a sequence of
nested hypotheses. Each horizontal cut represents a different hypothesis; in
the figure we display two of them: H ⊆ H ′.
Definition 2.3 (Strong union consonance). For every I,
3(∪i∈IHi)→ ∃i ∈ I s.t. 3Hi.
Strong union consonance is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I,¬3Hi ⇒ ¬3(∪i∈IHi)
that is, the ¬3-modality is closed under the union.
Definition 2.4 (Strong intersection consonance). For every I,
¬(∩i∈IHi)⇒ ∃i ∈ I s.t. ¬Hi.
Strong intersection consonance is equivalent to
∀i ∈ I,Hi ⇒ (∩i∈IHi),
that is, the -modality is closed under the intersection.
Figure 4 illustrates Definitions 2.3 and 2.4. For union consonance, con-
sider a triangle in which each vertex represents the possibility of a single
hypothesis. If one obtains the center of the triangle and the union of all hy-
potheses is possible, then one also obtains at least one of the midpoints of the
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3(A ∪ B ∪C)
3(A ∪ B)
3(B ∪ C)3(A ∪ C)
3C
3A 3B
¬(A ∩ B ∩ C)
¬(A ∩ B)
¬(B ∩C)¬(A ∩ C)
¬C
¬A ¬B
Figure 4: Logical implications induced by strong union consonance (left) and
strong intersection consonance (right). If one obtains the conclusion in the
center of the triangle, then one obtains at least one of the conclusions in the
middle of the edges of the triangle and another in the vertices connected to
this edge. That is, there exists at least one path such as the one illustrated
by the blue arrows.
edge, representing the possibilities of pairwise unions, and at least one of the
vertices connected to this edge. Figure 4 also illustrates the symmetry be-
tween strong union consonance and strong intersection consonance. Indeed,
if invertibility holds, then these types of consonance are equivalent.
2.4 The logic of credal modalities in logically consis-
tent hypothesis tests
A hypothesis test is logically consistent if it satisfies invertibility, monotonic-
ity, union and intersection consonance, and Θ is obtained. Logically consis-
tent tests have properties that improve their computation and interpretation.
For example, it follows from invertibility and Table 1 that, for every hypoth-
esis H , H and H˜ cannot be simultaneously obtained. That is, a logically
consistent hypothesis test admits no contradictions.
Logically consistent tests also allow the use of classical logic to obtain
deductions over decided hypotheses. In order to show this property, we
9
use the functionally complete “nand” operator (↑), either as defined over
truth values or as defined over hypotheses (sets). Over hypotheses, H1 ↑
H2 := Θ − (H1 ∩ H2). It follows that, for example, H1 ∧ H2 = H1 ∩ H2,
H1 ∨ H2 = H1 ∪H2 and ¬H1 = Θ −H1. Over truth values, H1 ↑ H2 is
obtained if and only if either H1 is not obtained or H2 is not obtained.
Lemma 6.1 in the appendix shows that, if a test is logically consistent and
H1 and H2 are decided (∆H1 and ∆H2 are obtained), then (H1 ↑ H2) is
obtained if and only if H1 ↑ H2 is obtained. In other words, if a test
is logically consistent and H1, . . . , Hn are decided, then, for every logical
proposition, P , P (H1, . . . , Hn) is obtained if and only if P (H1, . . . ,Hn)
is obtained. Once one has decided the credal modality of H1, . . . , Hn, com-
puting P (H1, . . . ,Hn) is usually cheaper than computing P (H1, . . . , Hn)
by directly applying the statistical test. Also, this ability to treat decided
hypothesis as if they were true or false makes the outcomes of the test easier
to interpret.
Besides the application of classical logic to decided hypotheses, one can
also use it between different credal modalities. For example, the implications
in Figures 1 to 4 are transitive. This can be used to obtain new relations
by combining the implications in each of the figures. For example, it fol-
lows from Figure 2 that (¬3H) → (H˜). Also, it follows from Figure 1
that (H˜) → (3H˜). Therefore, one can conclude that (¬3H) → (H˜).
Similarly, it follows from Figure 2 that (H) → ¬(3H˜). Also, it follows
from the contrariety relation in Figure 1 that is obtained from Table 1 that
(3H˜) → (¬∇H˜). By combining these results one can conclude that, if H
is obtained, then ∇H˜ is not obtained.
Despite the advantages of working with logically consistent hypothesis
tests, several standard tests available in the statistical literature are logically
inconsistent. Indeed, standard hypothesis tests can fail basic logical proper-
ties. The following section investigates examples of logical inconsistency in
frequentist and Bayesian statistics.
3 Logical inconsistency of standard tests
Hypothesis tests are often used to determine beliefs. Using Table 1, one can
translate each possible result of an hypothesis test to a credal modality. In
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case a hypothesis test does not satisfy all the properties in Section 2, then we
say the resulting logical system is incoherent. Even though it is challenging to
communicate and interpret these systems, they are the ones that are generally
obtained from standard hypothesis tests. The next subsection revisits some
known examples of logical inconsistencies in classical tests.
3.1 Classical tests
• Failure of invertibility: Tests based on p-values treat the null and
the alternative hypotheses differently. Indeed, the p-value is calculated
using solely probabilities obtained under the null hypothesis; probabil-
ities obtained under alternative hypotheses are left out. As a result, a
test based on a p-value generally will not be invertible.
• Failure of monotonicity: Under regularity conditions, one can as-
sume that if two individuals have the same genotype, then they will
also have the same corresponding phenotypical characteristics. How-
ever, Izbicki et al. (2012) shows that the likelihood ratio test can reject
the hypothesis that two individuals have the same phenotype and not
reject the hypothesis that they have the same genotype.
• Failure of consonance: Consider the standard framework of analysis
of variance with three groups. Let α1, α2 and α3 be the unknown
means of each group. Izbicki and Esteves (2015) shows that, using the
generalized likelihood ratio test, one can conclude that “α1 = α2 =
α3 = 0” is impossible and, at the same time, conclude that “αi = 0” is
possible, for every i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
As an alternative to the above classical procedures, one might consider
a Bayesian hypothesis test. One such hypothesis test obtains the credal
modality for a hypothesis from its posterior probability. Specifically, the
credal modality is chosen according to cutoff levels of the posterior probabil-
ity. For simplicity, these tests are called “posterior probability cutoff tests”.
Since posterior probability tests are coherent from the perspective of Statis-
tical Decision Theory, one might expect that they are also logically coherent.
This is not the case, as shown in the following section.
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Decision
Truth
H ¬H
⊞H 0 1
¬ +3H a 0
Table 2: Example of a loss function for a Bayesian hypothesis test.
3.2 Posterior probability cutoff tests
Posterior probabilities can be used to define probabilistic modal operators (⊞,
+3, +∇ and +∆), as explained in the following paragraphs. We use these special
symbols to distinguish the probabilistic operators from the standard (alethic)
operators that were used so far: , 3, ∇ and ∆.
A Bayesian statistical model considers two types of random variables: a
parameter θ in the parameter space Θ, and data, X , in the sample space, χ.
While parameters correspond to unknown quantities, the data correspond to
observable or observed quantities.
The uncertainty about the model’s variables is described through proba-
bility statements. Before observing the data, the joint distribution for θ and
X is denoted by p(θ, x). By integrating x out of the joint distribution, one
obtains
p(θ) =
∫
χ
p(θ, x)dx
The distribution p(θ) is called the prior distribution for θ, since it represents
the uncertainty about θ before observing X .
After the value x of X is observed, the uncertainty about θ is updated
based on this observation. One’s uncertainty about θ changes from p(θ) to
p(θ | x), the probability of θ given x. The latter term is called the posterior
distribution for θ and can be obtained using Bayes Theorem:
p(θ | x) =
p(θ)p(x | θ)∫
Θ
p(θ, x)dθ
(1)
In order to attribute a credal modality to a hypothesis under scrutiny,
one can use Bayesian decision theory (DeGroot, 2005). In this context, one
chooses a credal modality by minimizing the expected penalty that derives
12
Decision
Truth
H ¬H
⊞H 0 1
+∇ H b b
¬ +3H a 0
Table 3: Example of a loss function for an agnostic Bayesian hypothesis test.
from a given loss function. Table 2 presents a loss function that is typically
used in Bayesian hypothesis tests. If H is true and one decides that H is
necessary, then the loss is 0. Similarly, if H is false and one decides that H is
impossible, then the loss is 0. However, if H is true and one decides that H
is impossible, then the loss is a, where a > 0. This type of decision is called
a type-1 error. Similarly, if H is false and one decides that H is necessary,
then the loss is 1. This type of decision is called a type-2 error. The constant
a defines how much a type-1 error is worse than a type-2 error. When a = 1,
both types of error are equally undesirable.
The optimal decision for the loss function in Table 2 is to choose ⊞H ,
when p(H | x) > (1 + a)−1, and ¬ +3H , when p(H | x) < (1 + a)−1. In other
words, the credal modality for each hypothesis is decided based on a cutoff
of the posterior probability. If the posterior probability of a hypothesis is
sufficiently high, then one concludes that it is necessary. Otherwise, one
concludes that the hypothesis is impossible.
The loss function in Table 2 can be extended to agnostic hypothesis tests,
as presented in Table 3. In agnostic tests, one can choose to let the hypothesis
be undecided, that is, one can choose +∇ H . Whenever this option is chosen,
one commits a type-3 error and incurs in a loss of b, where 0 < b < min(a, 1).
This range of values for b implies that, by remaining agnostic, one loses less
than by taking a wrong decision and more than by taking a correct decision.
The optimal decision for this loss function is similar to the one that was
discussed for standard tests. By taking c1 = max((1 + a)
−1, 1 − b) and
c2 = min((1 + a)
−1, b
a
), one obtains that the optimal test is:
Choose credal modality

⊞H , if p(H | x) > c1
¬ +3H , if p(H | x) < c2
+∇ H , otherwise.
(2)
13
¬⊞H
+∇ H
+3H
⊞H
+∆ H ¬ +3H
p(H|x)
−
−
1
c1
c2
0
Figure 5: Typical hexagon of statistical modalities for the posterior proba-
bility cutoff test, given by Table 3. The colored edges indicate the chosen
modalities as a function of the posterior probability of H , p(H | x).
In words, the probabilistic modal operator is obtained by comparing the
posterior probability of the hypothesis, H , to the cutoffs, c1 and c2. If p(H | x)
is larger than the upper cutoff, c1, then the optimal decision is that H is
necessary. If p(H | x) is smaller than the lower cutoff, c2, then the optimal
decision is that H is impossible. Finally, for intermediate values of p(H | x),
H remains undecided. This test is illustrated in Figure 5.
The posterior probability cutoff tests are logically incoherent. Although
the values of a and b can be chosen so that the tests are invertible and
monotonic, these tests are not consonant. The main argument for the lack
of consonance can be presented in two steps. First, the hypothesis H0 : θ ∈
Θ has probability 1. Second, H0 can generally be partitioned into a large
collection of hypotheses, H1, . . . , Hn, such that each P (Hi | x) is arbitrarily
small. As a result, the cutoff tests obtain thatH0 is necessary andH1, . . . , Hn
are all impossible, that is, they lack consonance with respect to the union
operation. A similar example shows that these tests also are not consonant
with respect to intersection.
The results of this section show that several standard hypothesis tests
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H˜
A : H
S
H
H˜
E : ¬3H
S
H
H˜
Y : ∇H
Figure 6: A test for hypothesis H based on the region estimator for θ, S.
cannot be made logically consistent. In the following section, we discuss how
to obtain logically consistent hypothesis tests.
4 Logically consistent agnostic hypothesis tests
A logically consistent agnostic hypothesis test satisfies all the properties de-
scribed in Section 2: invertibility, monotonicity, union and intersection con-
sonance, and Θ is obtained. Esteves et al. (2016) shows that every logically
consistent agnostic testing scheme can be obtained from a region estimator
(a set of plausible values for θ). More precisely, for every logically consistent
test, there exists a region estimator, S ⊆ Θ, such that the test is of the form
Choose credal modality

H if S ⊆ H
¬3H if S ⊆ H˜
∇H if S ∩H 6= ∅ and S ∩ H˜ 6= ∅
The tests that are of the above type are called region-based tests. Figure 6
illustrates such tests. No matter what region estimator, S, is used, the test
based on S is logically consistent (Esteves et al., 2016). In order for the test
to have additional statistical properties, S might be built using the Bayesian
or the frequentist frameworks. In the following, we describe a particular
type of region-based test: the Generalized Full Bayesian Significance Test
(GFBST). This test is an extension of the Full Bayesian Significance Test
(Pereira and Stern, 1999) (FBST) to agnostic hypothesis tests.
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FBST and GFBST
Credal modalities that are obtained from a possibilistic measure (Dubois and Prade,
1982, 2012) are defined as possibilistic (or alethic) modal operators (, 3,
∇ and ∆). Note that these symbols are different from the ones used for
the probability modal operators. Hereafter, we study the possibilistic modal
operators that are obtained from the FBST and the GFBST.
The FBST is based on the epistemic value of the hypothesis of inter-
est given the observed data, ev (H | x). The epistemic value is a transfor-
mation of a probability into a possibility measure (Borges and Stern, 2007;
Stern and Pereira, 2014). Specifically, ev (H | x) is obtained through the
steps:
1. Define a surprise function, s(θ | x) = p(θ |x)
r(θ)
, where r(θ) is a reference
density over Θ (Stern, 2011a). The reference density can be interpreted
as an invariant measure under a relevant transformation group. For
example, the reference density may be obtained from the information
geometry according to a metric on the parameter space (Stern, 2011b).
2. Define the tangent set to H , T (H), as T (H), where,
T (H) = {θ1 ∈ Θ | ∀θ0 ∈ H, s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)}
Note that T (H) ∩ H = ∅, that is, the tangent set to an hypothesis
and the hypothesis are disjoint. This aspect of the e-value’s definition
is motivated by the legal principle known as in dubio pro reo (most
favorable interpretation, benefit of the doubt, or presumption of inno-
cence) (Stern, 2003). Intuitively, only parameter points that are more
probable than every point of a given hypothesis can be admitted as
witnesses against this hypothesis.
3. Obtain ev (H | x) = 1− p (T (H) | x).
Alernatively, Lemma 6.2 in the appendix shows how ev (H | x) can be
obtained as a function of ev ({θ0} | x), for each θ0 ∈ H .
The FBST chooses H when ev (H | x) > c, and ¬3H when ev (H | x) ≤
c, where c ∈ (0, 1) is a cutoff defined by the practitioner. This procedure is
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similar to region-based tests. Indeed, if S = {θ0 ∈ Θ : ev ({θ0} | x) > c},
then Theorem 6.3 shows that the FBST has the form
Choose credal modality
{
¬3H , if S ⊆ H˜
H , otherwise.
The GFBST extends the FBST into a region-based agnostic hypothesis
test. Let S be such as in the previous paragraph. The GFBST has the form:
Choose credal modality

¬3H , if S ⊆ H˜ (S ∩H = ∅)
H , if S ⊆ H (S ∩ H˜ = ∅)
∇H , if S ∩H 6= ∅ and S ∩ H˜ 6= ∅.
While in the FBST, S∩H 6= ∅ implies H , in the GFBST this case can lead
to either H or ∇H . Since this difference makes the GFBST a region-based
test, it is logically consistent. By applying Theorem 6.3, the GFBST can
also be written as a function of ev (H | x) and ev (H˜ | x):
Choose credal modality

¬3H , if ev (H | x) ≤ c
H , if ev (H˜ | x) ≤ c
∇H , otherwise.
(3)
Remark: In previous references, the tangent set to H was defined as
T ∗(H) = {θ1 ∈ Θ : s(θ1 | x) > supθ0∈H s(θ0 | x)}. Under regularity condi-
tions that are usually found in statistical models (Izbicki and Esteves, 2015,
ex.3.23), p(T ∗(H) | x) = p(T (H) | x). Hence, in these cases, both definitions
lead to the same results. However, only T (H) allows the assumption-free
characterization in Equation (3).
The GFBST can be made more interpretable using some properties of
ev . Note that, for every H , either T (H) = ∅ or T (H˜) = ∅. Therefore, either
ev (H | x) = 1 or ev (H˜ | x) = 1. When ev (H | x) = 1 and ev (H˜ | x) = 1, no
matter what the value of c is, ∇H and∇H˜ are obtained. When ev (H | x) = 1
and ev (H˜ | x) < 1, either H and ¬3H˜ are obtained, or ∇H and ∇H˜ are
obtained. Similarly, if ev (H˜ | x) = 1 and ev (H | x) < 1, then either H˜ and
¬3H are obtained or ∇H and ∇H˜ are obtained. Figure 7 illustrates this
behavior when ev (H | x) = 1 and ev (H˜ | x) < 1. For every c ∈ (0, 1), ¬3H
is not obtained. This behavior is different from the one in Figure 5.
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¬2H
∇H
3H
2H
∆H ¬3H
c = 1
c = 0
ev (H˜|x)−
¬2H˜
∇H˜
3H˜
2H˜
∆H˜ ¬3H˜
Figure 7: Example of the behavior of the GFBST for a fixed sample x as
a function of the cutoff, c, when the supremum of the surprise function is
obtained only in H . The prisms on the left and right side represent the
results obtained by the GFBST when applied, respectively, to H and H˜ .
The hexagon obtained from each horizontal cut represents the GFBST test
that uses the corresponding cutoff. The colored edges represent the credal
modalities that are obtained from the GFBST as a function of the cutoff
value.
5 Hybrid hexagons: Relations between prob-
abilistic and possibilistic modal operators
Although the posterior probability test and the GFBST have different logical
properties, It follows from the characterization of the GFBST in Section 4,
that H can be made a more stringent modality than +3H . Indeed, if c < 0.5
in Equation (3), then Theorem 6.4 in the Appendix proves that
H ⇒ p(H | x) ≥ 1− c⇒ 3H (4)
Therefore, in Equation (2), the cutoffs c1 = 1− c and c2 = c yield
H ⇒ ⊞H ⇒ +3H ⇒ 3H
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∆H
2H
3H
∇H
¬2H
¬3H
¬ +3H
¬⊞H+3H
⊞H
+∆ H
+∇ H
Figure 8: Nested hexagon of opposition that shows the implication relations
between the probabilistic and possibilistic modal operators.
These relationships are summarized in the nested hexagon of Figure 8. The
above implications show that it is possible to combine the two types of credal
modality into a single hexagon of oppositions. Since the hexagon of oppo-
sitions has two degrees of freedom and the implication H ⇒+3H holds, it
is possible to use H as the necessity modality and +3H as the possibility
modality in a new hexagon of oppositions. Similarly, since ⊞H ⇒ 3H holds,
one can use ⊞H as the necessity modality and 3H as the possibility modality
in another hexagon of oppositions. Similar hybrid hexagons have appeared
in Carnielli and Pizzi (2008); Demey and Smessaert (2014).
Figure 9 illustrates the hybrid hexagon obtained using H and +3H .
This hexagon summarizes several relations between H and +3H that can be
proved using the fact that H ⇒+3H . In particular, note that, if p(H) = 0,
then it follows from Equation (1) that p(H | x) = 0. Therefore, it follows from
Equation (2) that ¬ +3H holds. Using the contrariety relation in Figure 9,
one can conclude that H does not hold. In summary, if a hypothesis, H ,
is such that p(H) = 0, then H is not accepted by the GFBST.
The previous conclusion is compatible with a common idea in Statis-
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Figure 9: Hybrid hexagon of oppositions that is obtained from combining
probabilistic and possibilistic modalities.
tics: if p(H) = 0, then one cannot accept H ; one can only fail to reject H
(Gigerenzer, 2004; Inman, 1994). Indeed, if p(H) = 0, then ¬H is obtained,
that is, the GFBST cannot accept H . However, even though p(H) = 0, it
is possible to obtain 3H , that is, the GFBST can fail to reject H . How-
ever, when p(H) = 0, then p(H | x) = 0 and ¬ +3H is obtained, that is, the
posterior probability test always rejects H .
The above result might be surprising, given the importance of null proba-
bility hypotheses in the theoretical and empirical sciences (Stern, 2015). For
example, if Θ = Rd, then it is common to find hypotheses in the form of
linear equations, H : Aθ = b, where matrix A is h × d. This case includes,
for example, the simple null hypothesis H : θ = c. In case the distribution
of θ is continuous, then p(H) = 0 and, for every x, p(H | x) = 0. Therefore,
while the probability cutoff test always obtains ¬ +3H for precise hypothe-
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ses, the GFBST can either obtain ∇H or ¬3H . That is, while the credal
modality obtained from the probability cutoff test for precise hypotheses is
known beforehand, the GFBST allows one to use data to revisit their beliefs
regarding these hypotheses.
6 Conclusions and Final Remarks
We show how the hexagon of oppositions can be a useful tool to explain con-
sistency properties of statistical hypothesis tests. Indeed, geometric solids
composed of hexagons of oppositions illustrate the conditions for a statis-
tical hypothesis test to be logically consistent. Also, prisms composed of
hexagons of oppositions explain the definitions of hypothesis tests such as
the probability cutoff test and the GFBST. A hybrid hexagon of opposi-
tions summarizes the logical relations between these tests. In summary, the
hexagon of opposition can be used as a powerful form of diagrammatic rep-
resentation that is helpful in organizing, displaying and explaining complex
logical properties of multiple statistical tests of hypothesis and their intricate
inter-relationships.
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Proofs
Lemma 6.1. If ∆H1 and ∆H2 are obtained in a logically consistent hypoth-
esis test, then (H1 ↑ H2) is obtained if and only if H1 ↑ H2 is obtained.
Proof. If (H1 ↑ H2) is obtained, then (Θ − (H1 ∩ H2)) is obtained. It
follows from invertibility that ¬3(H1∩H2) is obtained. Therefore, it follows
from an implication relation in Figure 1 that ¬(H1∩H2) is obtained. Hence,
using intersection consonance, either ¬H1 or ¬H2 is obtained. Conclude
from a contradiction relation in Figure 1 that either H1 is not obtained or
H2 is not obtained, that is, H1 ↑ H2 is obtained.
If H1 ↑ H2 is obtained, then either H1 is not obtained or H2 is
not obtained. Hence, using a contradiction relation in Figure 1, either ¬H1
or ¬H2 is obtained. Since by hypothesis ∆H1 and ∆H2 are obtained, it
follows from Table 1 that either ¬3H1 or ¬3H2 is obtained. Therefore,
using monotonicity, ¬3(H1 ∩ H2) is obtained. It follows from invertibility
that (Θ− (H1 ∩H2)) is obtained, that is, (H1 ↑ H2) is obtained.

Lemma 6.2. ev (H | x) = supθ0∈H ev ({θ0} | x)
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Proof.
ev (H | x) = 1− p({θ1 ∈ Θ | ∀θ0 ∈ H, s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)} | x)
= 1− p(∩θ0∈H{θ1 ∈ Θ | s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)} | x)
= 1− inf
θ0∈H
p({θ1 ∈ Θ | s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)} | x)
= 1− inf
θ0∈H
p(T ({θ0}) | x) = sup
θ0∈H
ev({θ0} | x)

Theorem 6.3. Let S = {θ0 ∈ Θ : ev ({θ0} | x) > c}. For every H ⊆ Θ,
ev (H | x) ≤ c if and only if H ∩ S = ∅.
Proof. Note that ev (H | x) ≤ c if and only if supθ0∈H ev ({θ0} | x) ≤ c
(Lemma 6.2). That is, ev (H | x) ≤ c if and only if S ∩H = ∅.

Theorem 6.4. If c < 0.5 in Equation (3), then
H ⇒ p(H | x) ≥ 1− c⇒ p(H | x) > c⇒ 3H
Proof. For every ΘH ⊂ Θ,
1− ev (H˜ | x) = p(θ ∈ T (H˜) | x)
= p(θ ∈ {θ1 ∈ Θ | ∀θ0 ∈ H˜, s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)} | x)
≤ p(θ ∈ ΘH | x) = p(H | x), (5)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
{θ1 ∈ Θ | ∀θ0 ∈ H˜, s(θ1 | x) > s(θ0 | x)} ⊆ Θ−ΘH˜ = ΘH .
Similarly, one can obtain
1− ev (H | x) ≤ p(H˜ | x) (6)
Assume thatH is obtained. It follows from Equation (3) that ev (H˜ | x) ≤
c, that is, 1− ev (H˜ | x) ≥ 1−c. Conclude from Equation (5) that p(H | x) ≥
1 − c. Then, since c < 0.5, it holds that p(H|x) > c. Therefore, p(H˜ | x) <
1 − c. Conclude from Equation (6) that 1 − ev (H | x) < 1 − c, that is,
ev (H | x) > c. It follows from Equation (3) that 3H is obtained. 
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